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THE BASES AND RANGE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL MATTERS
Harold G. Maier*

I. INTRODUCTION

The allocation of power between the states and the nation gives
rise to a basic and pervasive problem in our federal system of
government. Nowhere is it more important, nor less susceptible to a
precise solution, than in those areas in which the affairs of this nation touch those of other nations in the world community. In
delineating the boundaries of state and federal power in cases of this
kind, the courts create what has been called "the federal common law
of foreign relations." 1 For clarity, two divisions of this body of law
must be distinguished. One category consists of cases dealing with the
supremacy of federal law in situations where the national government
has exercised law-making power to establish a rule of decision. In
these cases, the supremacy of federal law is clear, although, in some
instances, the specific content of the rule may be obscure. The Court's
method in such cases is excellently described by Justice Jackson in his
concurring opinion in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.FederalDeposit Ins.
Corp.,2 a purely domestic case involving the applicability of the
doctrine of holder in due course to a fraudulently executed note held
by a bank insured by the respondent.
Although by Congressional command this case is to be deemed one arising
under the laws of the United States, no federal statute purports to define
the Corporation's rights as a holder of the note in suit or the liability of the
maker thereof. There arises, therefore, the question whether in deciding the
case we are bound to apply the law of some particular state or whether, to
put it bluntly, we 3may make our own law from materials found in
common-law sources.

Later in the opinion, the Court identified those "materials."
Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and
is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., 1959, J.D., 1963, University of Cincinnati; LL.M., 1964, University of Michigan.
1. Moore, Federalismand ForeignRelations, DUKE L.J. 248, 251 (1965). See
generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 19
RECORD OF

N.Y.C.B.A/ 64 (1964).

2. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
3. 315 U.S. at 468.
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the traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the
sources of the common law in cases such as the present.4
In private international cases, a rule of decision may be found in an

international agreement promulgated either under the treaty power'
or by the executive acting alone. 6 It may be found either in executive
action, recognized by the courts as the implementation of an
appropriate executive function, as in the sovereign immunity cases, 7
or in a federal common law rule such as the act of state doctrine.' It
may, of course, be found in national legislation passed pursuant to
broad congressional power in this field.9 In each of these instances it
is firmly established that the national rule is supreme. It was in this
context that the Supreme Court wrote decisively in a 1937 landmark
decision:'" "Governmental power over external affairs is not
distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government.""
Today, the primary issue before the courts dealing with cases of this
type is not whether national power exists but rather which branch of
the national government should exercise power with respect to a
subject matter already identified by the existing national rule.
It is the second division of the federal common law of foreign
relations with which this article is primarily concerned. This category
consists of those situations in which there has been no exercise of
national authority to give content to a positive rule of decision that is
binding upon the states under the supremacy clause. The principal
issue here is to what extent does the very structure of the federal
system limit the exercise of state authority in situations containing an
international element but otherwise arising under state law. Despite
the admitted supremacy of the national government in foreign affairs,
there has been as yet no effective statement of a general analytical
approach to separate state from federal power in situations of this
kind.
4. 315 U.S. at 472.
5. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199 (1796).

6. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301

U.S. 324 (1937).
7. Republic of Mexico v.Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
8. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

9. Professor Louis I. Henkin suggests that Congress has the power to do

practically anything in the foreign affairs area which is presently accomplished by
international treaty. He suggests, however, that congressional power in this field
has not expanded as rapidly as the treaty power. See Henkin, The Treaty-Makers
and the Law-Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L.

903, 922 (1959).
10. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).

REV.

11. 301 U.S. at 330.
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Generally, cases within this second category are decided under
state law. Principles identical to those applied in purely domestic cases
are employed as a matter of course, usually without reference to any
special difficulties raised by the presence of a foreign element. The
courts, in the ordinary torts, contracts or domestic relations case
properly look to their own law, including conflicts rules, to determine
the parties' rights, even though international elements may be
present.1 2 Normally, the authority of state law in these cases is
correctly assumed.' s In many instances, however, states make de
facto foreign policy decisions in situations where the subject matter
otherwise falls within the ambit of traditional state authority. For
example, states may refuse to recognize foreign judgments on grounds

that the courts of the nation from which the judgment stems do not
treat American judgments with reciprocity. " State courts may decide
whether to enforce foreign tax claims under the traditional conflicts
rule that one state will not enforce the revenue laws of another1
State law determines the standing of an unrecognized government to
sue in state courts.' 6 States have restricted sales of foreign-made
products either directly, as under California's "Buy American"
legislation,'
or indirectly by means of licensing and notice requirements, as did South Carolina concerning Japanese textiles' 8 and Ohio
in the case of Communist-made goods.' ' The Supreme Court has
recognized broad state power to impose reciprocity and "benefit and
12. See, e.g., Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 43 F.2d 824 (2d
Cir. 1930); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
13. See Cheatham & Maier, Private InternationalLaw and Its Sources, 22
VAND. L. REV. 27, 42-43 (1968).
14. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); 38 CORNELL L.Q. 423
(1953); cf. Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219
N.Y.S. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd per curiam, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669
(1927); Comment, 12 VILL. L. REV. 618 (1967).
15. See Cohen, Nonenforcement of Foreign Tax Laws and the Act of State
Doctrine: A Conflict in Judicial Foreign Policy, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1970).
16. See Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts: Upright
v. Mercury Business Machines, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 275 (1962).
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § § 4300-05 (West 1966).
18. See Japanese Textiles and South Carolina Law, 34 DEP'T STATE BULL.
728 (1956).
19. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE §§ 536.01-.99 (1963). These
municipal ordinances have been held both constitutional and unconstitutional.
City of Columbus v. McGuire, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 331, 195 N.E.2d 916 (Columbus
Mun. Ct. 1963) (unconstitutional); City of Columbus v. Miqdadi, 25 Ohio Op. 2d
337, 195 N.E.2d 923 (Columbus Mun. Ct. 1963) (unconstitutional); City of
Columbus v. Salt Bros. Hardware, Crim. No. 17865, Columbus Mun. Ct., Jan. 10,
Vol. 5-No. I
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use" requirements in cases involving the passage of decedent's estates
to foreigners.' 0 In some of these situations, the validity of the state's
activities has been challenged successfully on constitutional grounds
but the decisions, taken as a whole, represent a piecemeal approach to
the broader question of the scope of state power.
During the past decade, there has been increasing attention on the
part of legal scholars to the need for a clear statement outlining the
divisions of state and federal power in this difficult area. 2 ' In two
important cases, the Supreme Court indicated renewed judicial
interest in the problem.2 2 To date, however, the federal courts have
not succeeded in establishing a uniform and workable guide by which
the validity of state action may be judged in the absence of definitive

federal policy. This deficiency has posed difficulties for state
legislatures in arriving at law-making decisions and for the courts in
testing the validity of the legislatures' acts. There has been no effective
articulation of a legal test to determine in what circumstances the
exercise of state law-making power is foreclosed by the nature of the
federal system itself, in the absence of a preemptive rule of decision
promulgated at the national level. The remainder of this article
reexamines the current tests applied to determine the scope of
permissible state activity in cases of this kind, with particular emphasis
upon the guides provided by the opinions in Zschernig v. Miller2 3 and
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,2 4 and suggests a functional
approach designed to establish an effective guide to state action which
gives proper emphasis to the requirements inherent in the structure of
the federal system.

II. THE ZSCHERNIG CASE
In Zschernig v. Miller, an Oregon statute denied to foreign heirs of
a resident decedent the right to inherit property unless the heirs could
prove:
1964 (unpublished) (constitutional), cited in Usher, California's Buy-American
Policy: Conflict with GATT and the Constitution, 17 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122
n.19. See generally Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor
Union, State, and Local Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
841 (1970).
20. See pp. 141-48 infra.
21. See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967); Moore, supra note 1.
22. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
23. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
24. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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(1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take
property on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign country;
(2) the right of United States citizens to receive payment here of funds
from estates in the foreign country; and
heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates
(3) the right of the foreign
"without confiscation." 25
The Oregon courts found that the heirs in this case, residents of East
Germany, had not established these three prerequisites and, consequently, that the property would escheat to the state of Oregon. The
statute was challenged in the Oregon Supreme Court on two grounds:
that its application in this case conflicted with two treaties concluded
between the United States and Germany;2 6 and that, in any event, the
statute was an unconstitutional interference with the foreign relations
power reserved to the national government. The Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected the challenge to the statute's constitutionality and

ruled that the 1923 treaty required the passage of the real but not the
personal property to the heirs. 2" The court cited as authority Clark v.
Allen, 28 a 1947 Supreme Court case involving the same treaty and
raising the same constitutional issues.
In the Clark case, Justice William 0. Douglas had ruled that a
California statute requiring reciprocity of inheritance rights did not
represent an "undue interference" with the federal foreign relations
powers and that the 1923 German-American treaty did not prevent
the application of the statute to personalty. When the Zschernig case
was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, three
possibilities were available. The Court could reaffirm Clark v. Allen in
toto and thus affirm the Oregon holding; it could reverse Clark v.
Allen's interpretation of the 1923 German treaty2 9 and thus find the
Oregon statute in conflict with supreme federal law; or it could retain
the interpretation of the 1923 treaty but strike down the statute as an
unconstitutional invasion of the federal foreign relations power. The
Supreme Court rejected the first two possibilities, despite amicus
urging by the Department of Justice to reconsider the treaty, 3" and
opted for the third.
25. 389 U.S. at 430-31.
26. Treaty with Germany on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights,
Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132 (1927), T.S. No. 725; Treaty with the Federal
Republic of Germany on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
[1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
27. Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Ore. 567, 412 P.2d 781 (1966). The court did
not deal with the 1954 treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany.
28. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
29. 331 U.S. at 508-14. The parties did not raise the question of the
applicability of the 1954 treaty on appeal in Zschernig.
30. 331 U.S. at 505.
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In Clark, the Court apparently had applied three tests to determine
the question of state interference with the foreign affairs power. The
tests were whether the state legislation evidenced an "improper
purpose" to influence foreign affairs; whether there was "actual
interference" with a specific federal foreign policy; and whether there
was some general "adverse effect" upon international relations. The
opinion did not identify these tests separately and the Court may have
been unaware that it was dealing with three separate issues. First, the
petitioners argued that the purpose of the California statute was to
influence the conduct of foreign nations because the reciprocity
requirement on its face evidenced a motive "to promote the right of
American citizens to inherit abroad by offering to aliens reciprocal
rights of inheritance in California." 3 1 Such a purpose was outside the
scope of state competence. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
rejected this argument, as "farfetched." '3 2 Second, the opinion
considered whether there was actual interference with existing federal
policy. Apparently limiting itself to a consideration of whether the
statute interfered with foreign policy as evidenced by positive federal
law, the Court found no such interference. As part of this discussion,

the majority raised the third possible test: whether the state was
injuring international relations because its statutory policy had some
effect in foreign countries. If there was an effect of this kind, Justice
Douglas wrote, it was only "incidental or indirect." 3 3 Taken as a
whole, Clark rejected any test aimed at identifying an improper
purpose underlying state action. The opinion appears to have adopted
an "interference with national policy" test, although its fair implications are that, if state action could be shown to have more than an
incidental and indirect effect upon United States international
relations generally, this might render the state action unconstitutional
even though no conflict with a specific national policy could be
shown. Thus, after Clark it was unclear whether only a direct conflict
between state and federal law would preempt state action or whether
additional grounds for a finding of unconstitutionality would be
available.
Five years before Zschernig, the Court had rejected an
opportunity to reexamine Clark v. Allen. In Ioannou v. New York, 3 4

31. 331 U.S. at 516.
32. 331 U.S. at 517. Justice Douglas cited Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333
(1901), in which the Court had found that a provision in a state constitution
permitting aliens to inherit property did not violate the federal constitutional
prohibitions against states entering into agreements with foreign nations.
33. 331 U.S. at 517.
34. 371 U.S. 30 (1962).
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the Court scrutinized a New York statute which required a prospective
foreign distributee under a will to demonstrate that she would in fact
have the benefit and use of any personal property passed. The case
differed from Clark in that the statute did not contain a reciprocity
requirement and the prospective distributee, residing in
Czechoslovakia, had attempted to assign her interest in the estate to a
niece then living in England. Under the New York act, the funds were
to be placed in escrow. They did not escheat to the state. Justice
Douglas dissented from the Court's dismissal of the appeal "for want
of a substantial federal question." In his dissent, Justice Douglas in
effect endorsed all three tests implicitly presented in Clark. He argued
that a substantial federal question did exist because there was a real
issue concerning whether the application of the New York statute
"impaired the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy... under existing federal policy and practice"'3 I and whether there was a
"persistent and subtle" effect on international relations generally
which made the act unconstitutional. It is somewhat surprising in light
of the vehemence of his expression in Clark that Justice Douglas also
accepted the "improper purpose" test and suggested that the statute
might be void on its face. He wrote, "If New York's purpose is to
preclude unfriendly foreign governments from obtaining funds that
will assist their efforts hostile to this Nation's interests ....it
seemingly is an attempt to regulate foreign affairs."'3 6
Given both the emphasis upon federal authority in Banco Nacional

de Cuba v. Sabbatino3 7 and Justice Douglas's strong dissent in

Ioannou, the stage appeared to be set in Zschernig for an effective and
clarifying reexamination of the scope of state law-making power in
private international cases. Unfortunately, the Court not only failed to
deal clearly with the problems presented, but its opinion created even
greater uncertainty concerning the guidelines to be used by courts and
state legislatures in identifying the parameters of federal preemptive
authority.
Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in Zschernig. He used
essentially the same reasoning suggested in his dissent in Ioannou 3to8
hold that the Oregon statute was unconstitutional "as applied."2
Consequently, Zschernig implicitly adopts all three of the tests for
unwarranted interference found in Clark but does nothing to clarify
either the extent to which each is applicable or the weight which each
35. 371 U.S. at 32.
36. 371 U.S. at 34.
37. This aspect of Sabbatino is discussed in Part V of this article, pp. 159-62
infra.

38. The central portion of the Zschernig opinion is a quotation from Justice
Douglas' Ioannou dissent. Compare 389 U.S. at 440-41 with 371 U.S. at 32.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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is to be given in later cases.3 9 The rule as stated by Justice Douglas
appears to be that a state may make law in those subject-matter areas
which it has traditionally regulated unless:
(1) the state's law has an adverse affect upon international
relations;
(2) the state's law interferes with the national government in
carrying out an existing foreign policy;
(3) the purpose of the state law is one to be carried out only by
the national government.
No one of these three tests was isolated by the Court as a basis for its
decision. At one point, Justice Douglas seems to lump the first two
tests together, suggesting a "direct impact" upon foreign relations in
general and a possible adverse affect upon the power of the national
government to deal with those relations.4 0 In addition, he suggests
that the purpose behind the Oregon law is to effectuate the state's
own view of foreign policy and is therefore improper.
If the tests are read conjunctively, the holding can be reduced to
the rule that where a state enacts a statute regulating the descent of
39. "It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces
affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way. The practice of state
courts in withholding remittances to legatees residing in Communist countries or
in preventing them from assigning them is notorious. The several States, of course,
have traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates. But those
regulations must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's
foreign policy. Where those laws conflict with a treaty, they must bow to the
superior federal policy. Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State's policy may
disturb foreign relations. As we stated in Hines v. Davidowitz ... 'Experience has

shown that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even
leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects
inflicted, or permitted, by a government.' Certainly, a state could not deny
admission to a traveler from East Germany nor bar its citizens from going there. If
there are to be such restraints, they must be provided by the Federal Government.
The present Oregon law is not as gross an intrusion in the Federal domain as those
others might be. Yet, as we have said, it has a direct impact upon foreign relations
and may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with
those problems. The Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are
involved if each state, speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to
establish its own foreign policy." 389 U.S. at 44041 (citations omitted).
This quotation illustrates the rather hazy analysis prevalent throughout the
majority opinion. In the first sentence, Justice Douglas stresses the statute's
"persistent and subtle" effect upon international relations in general. In the third
sentence, he stresses the invalidity of regulations which "impair the effective
exercise of the Nation's foreign policy," illustrated in the next sentence by a
reference to conflict between an existing treaty and state law. He then refers to
state policy which may "disturb foreign relations" but chooses to illustrate such a
policy with a specific instance involving prohibition of alien travel by a state, a
situation clearly involving direct interference with a national decision.
40. 389 U.S. at 441.
Winter 1971
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estates to aliens, that statute is unconstitutional when it contains both
a benefit and use provision and a reciprocity requirement; has a
history of interpretation by the state courts which adversely affects
foreign relations; may interfere with the conduct of foreign policy by
the national government; and has a purpose more appropriately
carried out under federal aegis. That this holding is almost useless as
an effective tool for developing the law in future cases is illustrated by
the confusion which has arisen in efforts to interpret the Zschernig
holding.
III. ZSCHERNIG AFTERMATH
Almost immediately, the state of Oregon sought a clarification of
whether the Court had held that the Oregon statute was unconstitutional per se or merely unconstitutional "as applied" and, if the
latter, what were the limits of constitutional application. 4 ' The Court
denied a rehearing.4 2 This not only left the Court's position unclear
with respect to the Oregon act, but also cast into doubt the status of
all other similar state statutes.
Most state courts and some commentators have interpreted
Zschernig narrowly as a prohibition aimed solely at preventing
criticism of foreign governments or political institutions by state
judges or legislators. None of the cases after Zschernig have examined
the purpose of the state law as demonstrated by the legislative history
or the provisions of the statute. The Supreme Court itself appears to
43
be content to permit Zschernig to rest on its narrowest grounds.
Following the Zschernig decision, numerous cases have applied
the Supreme Court majority's somewhat foggy rationale on the issue
of improper state action. For purposes of the following discussion,
41. Petition for Clarification and Rehearing at 2, Zschernig v. Miller, 390 U.S.
974 (1967). After the decision, the frustration in Oregon legal circles was
apparent. See Snouffer, Nonresident Alien Inheritance Statutes and Foreign
Policy-A Conflict?, 47 ORE. L. REv. 390 (1968).
42. Zschernig v. Miller, 390 U.S. 974 (1967).
43. Following the Zschernig decision, a petition for rehearsing was filed in
Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962), on the grounds that, under the
Zschernig rule, New York's benefit and use statute which provided for court
custody of the funds, rather than escheat to the state, was unconstitutional. The
majority of the Court denied the petition on a representation by the New York
Attorney General that a new application could be filed in Surrogate's Court in
light of the changed circumstances represented by the Zschernig opinion. Ioannou
v. New York, 391 U.S. 604 (1968). Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of
rehearing on the grounds that the Zschernig rationale applied equally to New
York's custodial statute and to Oregon's escheat provision. Therefore, in his view,
Ioannou could be disposed of without reconsideration by the New York courts.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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these cases are divided into two categories: first, those which deal with
the distribution of estates to aliens and, second, those which interpret
the broader language of the Zschernig opinion to test state action in
other subject matter areas. The first group is subdivided into those
cases concerning state statutes which require only reciprocity on the
part of the foreign government toward American citizens as a
condition of inheritance of American domestic estates by the foreign
country's nationals, and those cases concerning statutes which require
only that the distributee be proven to have the benefit and use of the
property to be passed as a condition of inheritance. In the cases
dealing with alien estates, the courts appear to have felt constrained in

their interpretations by the similarity of the factual situations before
them to that in Zschernig and, therefore, have emphasized the
presence or absence of judicial improprieties as the ultimate test for
constitutionality. In the few cases outside the area of alien estates
which have interpreted Zschernig, the courts appear much more
willing to give effect to the spirit of the Zschernig opinion without
feeling constrained by the Supreme Court's limiting language concerning the effect of its decision on alien inheritance statutes in general.
The most striking illustration of a narrow and literal interpretation
of Zschernig is found in the strange case of Gorun v. Fall.4 4 John P.
Giurgiu died in 1966. His will established a trust, the proceeds of
which were to be paid to named relatives living in Romania. A
Montana statute4 5 required a showing by the prospective beneficiaries
that the foreign country recognized the right of United States citizens
to inherit property left to them by residents of that country and that
there were no restrictions on the movement of that property to the
United States. The statute further provided that where a reciprocal
right of inheritance did exist but the flow of funds or property was
restricted, the state of Montana should take custody of the funds and
hold them under the same restrictions on transfer which were applied
by the foreign country. Attorneys for the beneficiaries sought an
injunction against the enforcement of the Montana statute before a
three-judge federal district court on the grounds that the statute was
unconstitutional, citing Zschernig v. Miller. The district court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that reciprocity statutes
were not unconstitutional per se and that this statute required the
state courts to do no more than read the law of the foreign nation to
determine if reciprocity existed. The majority in Zschernig had
explicitly distinguished reciprocity provisions which required "mere

44. 393 U.S. 398 (1968).
45.

MONT.

REV. CODES

ANN. §

91-520 (1947).
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matching of laws" from the Oregon rules which it held unconstitutional. Earlier state cases decided under the Montana statute, in
which the courts had sought to determine de facto reciprocity, were
disregarded on the grounds that Montana had changed its procedure to
treat questions of foreign law as questions of law, not as questions of
fact as has been done before 1966.11 Relying heavily on Justice
Stewart's opinion in Zschernig, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the statute could not be applied "without
involving the Montana courts in the kind of foreign relations activities
proscribed by the Zschernig decision."'7 The Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal below per curiam with a concurring opinion by
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black, Harlan and Fortas.4 8
The concurring opinion pointed out that federal policy permits
the free flow of funds to Romania and that "a state probate judge is
not authorized to make or apply a probate rule contrary to that
federal policy."'4 9 From this the concurring Justices derived a
"clear-cut federal policy in favor of the claim of appellants." 5 0
The lack of clarity in Zschernig and, consequently, in the meaning
of the per curiam decision in Gorun was illustrated immediately when
the Gorun case was considered by the Montana probate court. At the
later hearing, that court ruled that the decisions in the federal courts
precluded any further investigation into the existence of actual
reciprocity between the United States and Romania, as required by

the Montana statute."' In so doing, the Montana court accepted the
rather naive conception of legal operations found in the opinion of the
majority in Zschernig and repeated by the three-judge court in Gorun:
namely, that reciprocity could be determined merely by laying
Montana law alongside the written evidence of foreign law to
determine whether they matched without any investigation into their
actual operations. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed
the probate court,5 2 ruling that the federal courts had not determined
the issue of reciprocity for purposes of Montana law and that the case
should be remanded for a determination of whether reciprocity
existed within the meaning of the Montana statute, with the burden of
proof on the foreign heirs. An appeal from this decision to the United
46. Gorun v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont. 1968).
47. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 5, Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398
(1968).
48. Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398 (1968).
49. 393 U.S. at 398-99.
50. 393 U.S. at 399.
51. In re Estate of Giurgiu, No. 9246, Lewis & Clark County Dist. Ct., Aug. 1,
1969, at 4 (unpublished).
52. In re Estate of Giurgiu, 155 Mont. 18,466 P.2d 83 (1970).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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States Supreme Court was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal
question."I I
A somewhat broader application of Zschernig is found in In re
Kraemer. 4 In that case, both the trial court and the California Court
of Appeals ruled that the same reciprocity statute5 I approved by the
Supreme Court in Clark v. Allen was now unconstitutional as a result
of Zschernig, despite the fact that Clark had not been overruled. The
appellate court based its decision on the fact that in the time
intervening between the Clark and Zschernig decisions, the California
statute, which contained reciprocity provisions similar to those in the
Oregon statute in Zschernig, had been "infected" with the same vices.
This was said to be demonstrated by several earlier California cases
which had indicated that California required more than a mere
matching of laws to determine whether reciprocity existed. The court
did not attempt to purge the statute of its unconstitutional interpretations but, rather, left it open to the California legislature to
reenact the law with a continuing requirement of reciprocity. The
court implied that such a reciprocity requirement would be valid if it
were made clear that the statute required only equality of formal legal
provisions, not an examination of practice to determine how the
foreign law was in fact administered. The impropriety of the
reciprocity requirement, as such, was not considered by the appellate
court, nor did it interpret the Zschernig case to establish a general
"improper purpose" test. The court was satisfied that the California
statute, taken together with its judicial gloss, had entered into the
forbidden field of foreign affairs and was consequently unconstitutional.
Judicial applications of Zschernig to pure benefit and use statutes
stress the impropriety of examining foreign governmental operations
to determine whether the distributee will have the actual use of the
funds passed. In Mora v.Battin,5 6 a three-judge federal district court
in Ohio ruled that Zschernig made the Ohio "iron curtain" statute
unconstitutional on its face. The statute required the probate judge to
place an estate otherwise passing to foreign distributees in trust if it
appeared that the distributees would not have the benefit or use of the
property "because of circumstances prevailing at the place of
residence of such... distributees."' ' I Plaintiffs were residents and
citizens of Czechoslovakia whose next of kin had died intestate in
53. Gorun v. Montana, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
54. 276 Cal. App. 2d 715, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
55. CAL. PROB.CODE § 259 (West 1942).
56. 303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
57. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.81 (Baldwin 1964).
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Ohio. The three-judge court ruled that the statute, as written, required
an examination into the operations of a foreign government and into

the economic, political and social conditions prevailing in the foreign
country. Thus, it violated the Zschernig rule. The district court went
on to suggest that the Ohio probate court could examine the statutory
law of Czechoslovakia to determine the question of benefit and use
but could go no further.
In In re Estate of Leikind,5 I the New York Surrogates' Court
ordered funds which would otherwise pass to relatives of the intestate
who were residents and citizens of the Soviet Union to be held by the
court pending proof that the foreign legatees would have the benefit
and use of the funds as required by New York law. A relative of the
foreign legatee living in the United States had obtained a default
judgment on a debt owed to him by the foreign distributee and sought
to execute upon the funds then held in custody by the New York
Director of Finance. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the
benefit and use requirement was not unconstitutional under Zschernig
because there was no showing that the statute's operation interfered
with the foreign relations of the United States. This was true as long as
the New York courts did no more than "routinely read" foreign
statutes to determine the rights of the prospective heirs in their home
country.5 9 The court did not examine the various purposes of the
statute. The United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from
the New York decision on the grounds that there was no final
judgment below. 6 0 Apparently this was done because it was unclear
whether the New York courts would treat satisfaction of a judgmentdebt to a creditor as a bona fide "use" of the impounded funds within
the meaning of the statute.6 1
In 1968, as a direct attempt to respond to the Zschernig decision,
the New York legislature amended section 2218 of the New York
Surrogate's Court Procedure Act,6 2 the same section considered in In
re Estate of Leikind. The first amended paragraph included a provision
that whenever the prospective alien distributee was domiciled or

resident within a country to which United States government checks
could not be sent, the proceeds were to be paid into court and held
for the distributee. Whether or not a country fell within that category
was determined by examination of a so-called Treasury List,6 3
58. 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968).
59. 22 N.Y.2d at 351, 239 N.E.2d at 553, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
60. Laikind v. Attorney General, 397 U.S. 148 (1970).
61. See 22 N.Y.2d at 355-56, 239 N.E.2d at 555, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 688-89

(Fuld, J., dissenting).
62. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoc. § 2218 (McKinney 1968).
63. 31 C.F.R. §211.2 (1971).
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regularly issued and revised by the Treasury Department. The second
paragraph of the amended statute provided for payment of such funds
into court when other special circumstances indicated that the
distributee would be deprived of their use. The third paragraph placed
the burden of proving beneficial use upon the prospective distributee.
The latter two paragraphs in the amended statute were tested in

Goldstein v. Cox."

In that case Romanian residents, who were

beneficiaries of an estate in New York, sought to enjoin the
application of the statute by the New York surrogates on constitutional grounds. The three-judge federal court denied summary
judgment on grounds that there was no showing of any state activity
that would amount to an interference with United States foreign
relations under the New York statute. The court ruled that under
Zschernig, evidence of improper application of the statute was
necessary. 65 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court dismissed
the Goldstein case on grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction
because the refusal by the three-judge court to grant the injunction
was not an "order denying.., an... injunction" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1253.66
The constitutionality of the New York statute's first paragraph
was challenged specifically and upheld in Bjarsch v. Difalco. 6 ' The
New York Surrogate's Court had impounded funds that were to be
distributed to remaindermen who were residents of the German
Democratic Republic under the terms of a trust established in the will
of a New York resident. East Germany was one of two countries
remaining on the Federal Treasury List.68 The remaindermen applied
for the convening of a three-judge district court to hear the
constitutional issues raised. 6 9 That panel found that the statute was
not unconstitutional on its face and, since the plaintiffs had not yet
sought release of the funds from the surrogate's court, it could not be
held unconstitutional as applied. The court, after a review of
Zschernig and the decisions which had preceeded and followed it,

found that benefit and use provisions were permitted as long as no
evidence of judicial impropriety of the kind alluded to in Zschernig,
nor any examination of the actual administration of foreign laws, was
present. Unlike the California court in In re Kraemer,' 0 the court did
64. 299 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
65. 299 F. Supp. at 1393.
66. Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 479 (1969).
67. 314 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
68. 31 C.F.R. § 211.2 (1971).
69. Bjarsch v. Difalco, 300 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
70. 276 Cal. App. 2d 715, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Discussed p. 144 supra.
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not find that the statute was infected with the vices of prior judicial
activity since it was clear that New York was making every effort to
comply with the Zschernig rule. It ruled that neither the due process
nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment would
be violated so long as New York used the Treasury List only as an
evidentiary presumption which could be rebutted by the production
of evidence by the remaindermen that they would, in fact, have the
use and control of their legacies. The court did not allude to a possible
logical inconsistency inherent in the two constitutional rules, one of
which precludes any judicial inquiry into the manner in which the
foreign laws in question are actually administered in order to avoid
interference with the foreign affairs power, while the other requires
the court to hear evidence of actual administration of laws in order to
avoid a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The court in Bjarsch did not address the question of whether the
use of the Treasury List as a criterion for state action intruded per se
into the foreign affairs realm. This question was considered by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Estate of Kish. 7 In that case, a
New Jersey resident willed property to residents of Hungary. Before
Zschernig v. Miller was decided by the United States Supreme Court,
the New Jersey Attorney General, representing contingent charitable
devisees, challenged the right of the named beneficiaries to take on the
grounds that they would not have the benefit and use of the property
passed, as required by the New Jersey statute.7 2 After the state lost in
the trial court and the Appellate Division affirmed, 7 3 the New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certiorari but directed that more evidence be
obtained on how the transmission of funds to the Hungarian legatees

was to be handled.7 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court heard the appeal
after Zschernig was decided. The court ruled that the Zschernig
decision did not prevent New Jersey from examining the physical
means by which the funds were to be transmitted in determining if
such means were likely to result in actual receipt of the funds by the
heirs. The court made it clear, however, that variations between the
"free market" exchange rate and the official Hungarian rate could not
be interpreted to amount to a deprivation of benefit and use of the
legacy, even though the amount the heirs would receive was smaller
under the official rate. The court ruled that examination of United
States Treasury Department Circular 655, which prohibits the
transmission of government checks or warrants to certain listed
71. 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968).
72. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:25-10 (1953).
73. Neither opinion is reported.
74. 52 N.J. at 461, 246 A.2d at 5.
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countries, was an inappropriate means of determining whether the
heirs would actually have the benefit or use of the funds passed, in
part because the Treasury determinations could involve political
considerations not relevant to remittances of private funds. Finally,
the court refused to engage in any consideration of tne generai
political and economic situation in Hungary as a means of determining
the rights of the heirs to retain the legacy under Hungarian law and
practice.
The cases above, together with those arising under the reciprocity
statutes, indicate that, although the exorcism of the "judicial
horribles" cited by the Zschernig majority has been effective, state
courts are applying varying criteria for determining the limits of state
power. More important, these later cases demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has not provided an effective expression of the
limitations on state action in -subject-matter areas other than
decendent's estates in which similar conflicts between state and federal
power arise. If Zschernig represents only a prohibition upon judicial
criticism of foreign governments, as the cases above imply, its scope is
narrow indeed.
In those few opinions which have not involved the descent or
distribution of estates to non-resident aliens but which have, nonetheless, cited the Zschernig decision as authority, the courts have taken a
broader view of the Zschernig holding. The farthest reaching of these
decisions is Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'r."5 In that
case, a contract had been awarded to the lowest competitive bidder to
supply structural steel for use by the city of Los Angeles. Bethlehem,

an unsuccessful bidder, brought suit to enjoin the award of the
contract and to recover damages on the ground that the successful
bidder had predicated his price upon the use of steel manufactured in
Japan. Bethlehem argued that the award violated the California "Buy
American" Act. 6 That act requires that contracts for the construction of public works or the purchase of materials for public use
be awarded only to persons who will agree to use or supply materials
either which have beery manufactured in the United States or which
have been produced substantially from materials manufactured in the
United States. Citing Zschernig, the California Court of Appeals
rejected the suit on the grounds that the California "Buy American"
Act was an unconstitutional encroachment upon the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs and represented an undue
interference with the United States' conduct of foreign relations. In so

75. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
76. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 4303 (West 1943).
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doing, the Court applied all of the possible tests mentioned in
Zschernig except the "judicial horribles" test, none of these being
present. First, the court found that the existence of countervailing
state policies was "wholly irrelevant" when weighed against the
purpose of placing an embargo on foreign products. Also, the court
pointed out that problems of foreign trade were national in scope and
could not be subject to resolution on a state-by-state basis. The court,
specifically, did not base its decision upon a conflict between the
"Buy American" Act and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)." Instead, it ruled that the act was unconstitutional without
regard to GATT, except as that agreement evidenced general federal
policy.7 8 Emphasizing the improper purpose of the state legislation,
the court concluded:
The present legislation is an impermissible attempt by the state to structure
national foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. It illustrates
the dangers which are involved if 7federal
policy is to be qualified by the
9
variant notions of the several states.

In South African Airways v. New York State Division of Human

Rights,8 0 Zschernig played a supporting, but not a controlling, role.
In that case, the New York State Division of Human Rights
summoned South African Airways to appear in order to answer
alleged violations of Executive Law, art. 15, § 293, which made it
unlawful to discriminate against persons in places of public accommodations because of race. The state charged that South African Airways
refused transportation to anyone who did not have a valid visa to visit
South Africa and that the South African Government regularly refused
visas to black persons. South African Airways sought an injunction in
the New York Supreme Court to prohibit the state from holding the
hearing. The court held that the Human Rights Division had no power
to hold the hearing because "such a hearing would interfere with a
federal act of state and the conduct of foreign affairs by the federal
77. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3
(1948), T.I.A.S. 1700.
78. In Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d
803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962), a California court of appeals
refused to apply the "Buy American" Act on the grounds that it had been
superceded by GATT. In that case, the court treated GATT as an international
agreement binding upon the states under the supremacy clause. Accord, Territory
v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1957). See generally Jackson, The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in the United States Domestic Law, 66 MIcH.L. REV. 250
(1967); Note, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 568 (1971) (suggests that state "Buy American"
statutes are unconstitutional under the commerce clause).
79. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 229, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
80. 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1970).
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government ' 8 1 citing Zschernig and other cases. The decision turned
on the fact that the hearing, of necessity, would question the policies,
not of the airline, but of the South African Government in granting or
withholding visas. The South African Government, itself, could not be
brought to the hearing because it was immune. Thus, since the airline
had the right to fly into the United States by treaty and executive
permission, an investigation into its activities would interfere with
United States foreign policy. The court distinguished American Jewish
Congress v. Carter8 2 on the grounds that in that case the alleged
discrimination was being carried out by the oil company itself rather
than by the foreign sovereign. South African Airways is more directly
related to the sovereign immunity cases than to Zschernig, but the
Zschernig rationale was used as a basis for dismissing the state's
complaint in the absence of positive federal law which directly
sanctioned the airline's actions. The direct permission to the South
African Government to grant visas and to operate on United States soil
was sufficient to prohibit state inquiry into its policies.8 3
In Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth,8 4 a dissenting

judge cited Zschernig for the proposition that the application of
Hawaii's long-arm statute to gain personal jurisdiction in Hawaii over a
British company which had manufactured a bus body in England was
unconstitutional, not only because it amounted to a denial of due
process but also because it was an unnecessary intrusion into the field
of international relations.8" The defendant had done no business in
Hawaii other than to sell the bus body to Vauxhall in England with
the knowledge that it would be used in Hawaii. The dissent reasoned
that subjecting an alien corporation to the jurisdiction of an American
court on the basis of an isolated transaction should be done only as a
matter of national policy, "particularly in light of possible reprisals,
political, economic, or legal." '8 6 Balanced against this possibility, the
dissent argued, any state interest in exercising jurisdiction was
outweighed by the interest of the nation. In view of the fact that there
was neither evidence of an objection by the British Government nor
any indication of a discriminatory attitude toward the British or the

81. 64 Misc. 2d at 710-11, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
82. 19 Misc. 2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1959), modified, 10 App. Div. 2d
833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1960), aff'd as modified, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788,
213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
83. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937).
84. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
85. 417 F.2d at 239 (Ely, J., dissenting).
86. 417 F.2d at 239-40 (Ely, J., dissenting).
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particular British firm, nor any indication that the application of the
long-arm statute by the Hawaiian courts was designed to achieve a goal
otherwise properly within the aegis of the national government, this
argument by the dissent based on the Zschernigrule appears to be the
broadest application of the Zschernig rationale to date. It certainly
goes far beyond the limited interpretation of Zschernig in the cases
involving decedent's estates.
Thus, in the cases which have followed Zschernig, the federal
common law rule of preemption has varied in scope from its relatively
narrow application in those cases involving the transmission of estates
to aliens, to quite broad applications in other cases where the
constraining influence of the obfuscatory language concerning the
validity of the specific statute in Zschernig could be disregarded.
IV.

THE TESTS ANALYSED

The majority opinion in Zschernig, taken as a whole, does not
provide an effective tool for identifying the division of state and
federal power in private international cases. Furthermore, neither the
interference with foreign policy test, nor the adverse effect on foreign
relations test, nor the improper purpose test is adequate alone to serve
as a useful guide for judicial decision.
The oldest and most often articulated test is that which prohibits
the states from exercising any law-making power that interferes with
an established policy being actively carried out by the national
government. Application of this test involves two determinations:
first, what the existing national policy is and, second, whether the
state action interferes with its operations. The easiest method of
determining the existence of a federal policy is to find it in existing
federal law. Where a written treaty, executive agreement or piece of
legislation is available, any state law that contravenes it is inoperative
under the supremacy clause. Where no such written law exists, the
court is left with alternative choices. It can rule either that there is no
federal preemption in the absence of conflict with positive federal law
or it can look to less definitive statements by the national government
to determine the existence of a policy with whose operations the state
law interferes. The first approach represents that taken in Clark v.
Allen,8 7 which, in effect, denies federal preemption unless there is
direct conflict between state action and positive federal law.
Apparently, this is the rule adopted by Justice Harlan in his
concurrence in Zschernig.8" This rule would stifle any attempt by the
87. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
88. 389 U.S. at 458-59.
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courts to develop by common law methods a rule of preemption based
upon the policies inherent in the federal constitutional structure.
Moreover, a rule establishing preemption only where there is a clear
statutory basis would leave much room for state action that would
impede the operation of national policies promulgated by the
executive through one of the many departments which deal with
foreign affairs under the executive power. Clearly, the Constitution
does not contemplate state freedom to interfere with these policies
any more than it contemplates state contravention of positive federal
foreign affairs law.
If the test for federal preemption is drawn broadly enough to
encompass implicit as well as explicit national policies, the task of
determining what the policies are is exceedingly difficult for the
judiciary. One possibility, of course, would be to adopt the approach
already employed in sovereign immunity cases and, to some degree, in
act of state situations.8 9 In these instances the executive communicates its desires to the court and the court automatically gives effect
to them. This approach was explicitly rejected by the Court in

Zschernig, where the State Department had expressly stated that the
statute in question did not injure American foreign policy. As Mr.
Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion, the "[r]esolution of
so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot vary from day to day
with the shifting winds at the State Department." 9
Considerable
question concerning the efficacy of executive determination of private
law issues in American courts has already been raised in the sovereign
immunity and act of state situations.9 1 Of primary importance,
particularly in cases where the question involves not judicial
abstention but rather preemption of state power, is the difficulty
which may confront a state legislature or court in communicating with
the federal government and in receiving a definitive answer to any
question which it has posed. Equally important is the fact that in
many instances the national government, particularly the Department
of State, might find it even more embarrassing to state, for the record,
its present operative policy than to permit the state to interfere with
the operation of that policy. Both of these problems are illustrated
sharply by the history of executive action in sovereign immunity cases
and under the Sabbatino Amendment. 9 2
89. See generally Maier, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State: Correlative or
ConflictingPolicies, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 556 (1966).
90. 389 U.S. at 443.
91. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for
Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 901 (1969).
92. See Cheatham & Maier, supra note 13, at 83-94.
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The difficulties in determining what federal policy is and whether
the questioned state action interferes with that policy are multiplied
when the courts must look to general statements and acts of the State
Department. In instances where there has been no statement of federal
policy directed to the particular situation, the court or legislature
would be reduced to reading the newspapers in order to devine either
the government's approach to the question presented or the government's attitude toward the particular country most immediately
affected by the state's law. It was the very difficulty of identifying

executive policy and the dangers inherent in "second-guessing" the
Executive which prompted the Court in Sabbatino9 3 to overturn
those lower courts that had found a release from the act of state
doctrine in general federal pronouncements concerning United States
relations with Cuba.9 4 In summary, it appears that a test requiring a
demonstrated interference with national foreign policy as a prerequisite for federal preemption is either too narrow to be effective or,
if sufficiently broad, requires factual determinations which courts and
state legislatures are not equipped to make.
The second test rests upon the possible adverse affect of state
action on United States foreign relations rather than upon state
interference with specific activities or policies of the national
government. The attitudes and responses of foreign governments to
the actions of the state are the determining factor. The theory
underlying this test is that, since the state has no international
standing or responsibility as a political unit, any adverse response by a
foreign nation to the state's action would be directed against the
United States national government, which bears inherent international
responsibility for injury caused to other nations.9 I To separate the
responsibility for performing the decision-making function from the
responsibility for answering to other nations for the results of that
decision would remove from the decision-maker the necessity of
tempering his actions in light of the consequences which he must
suffer because of those decisions. Even assuming a careful and good
faith assessment by the state government of the possible international
consequences of its acts, information available to state decision-

makers is so limited as to make any truly effective evaluation of these
consequences impossible. If the states are permitted to take action
93. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
94. 376 U.S. at 432; see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845
(2d Cir. 1962); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
95. See, e.g., 6 J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837-41
(1906) (diplomatic exchange concerning the lynching of several Italian citizens in
New Orleans in 1891).
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which adversely effects international relations, the national government would have no control over those state acts which are likely to
bring on the foreign protests with which it alone may deal. Thus, the
"adverse effect" test would prevent the separation of the decision to
take action which might disturb a foreign country from the
responsibility for answering for the results of that decision by
precluding all state action which might tend to affect adversely United
States foreign relations.
The principal objection to this test is that it is far too broad. Many
kinds of state action clearly within the ambit of state power may
ruffle the sensitivities of foreign nations. Illustrations may be found in
the normal exercise of state police power to quarantine animals, to
reject food products coming from outside a designated geographic
area, or to control participation in certain professions and businesses
by foreigners. 9 6 For example, Professor John Norton Moore, writing
before the passage of the modern civil rights acts in the United States,
suggested that state attitudes toward minority groups might affect
adversely the relationships of the United States with countries in
which those groups have an ethnic connection. 9 7 Indeed, almost any
state action could have a "persistent and subtle" effect upon
international relations. The need to determine whether that action is
preempted by the Constitution in favor of the national government,
however, requires a judgment concerning the degree of effect required
to invalidate the state action. To charge the federal judiciary, not to
mention a state court or legislature, with this kind of factual
determination raises even greater objections than those noted above in
connection with the first test. Short of direct acquiescence by the
courts or the state legislatures in an executive suggestion that a given
state practice creates sufficient international disharmony as to be
prohibited, the "adverse effect" test would require courts, state
governments, and, ultimately, the Supreme Court, to assess potential
or actual international responses to given state actions in order to
make a realistic determination. If the Court assesses the situation
inaccurately, the national government has little or no recourse but to
live with the decision, no matter how great the international
difficulties, unless legislation or an international agreement could be
obtained to override the state action by positive federal law.9 8 The
96. See generally M.

MASSEL,

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

64-70

(1962).

97. Moore, supra note 1, at 288; cf South African Airways v. New York
State Division of Human Rights, 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1970)
(discussed pp. 149-50 supra; p. 169 infra).
98. See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1027, 1057 (1967).
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degree of international disharmony created by state action is
exceedingly difficult for the courts to determine. The mere absence of
diplomatic protests is hardly a sufficient ground to assume no
exacerbation of foreign relations. This fact is illustrated in the
Zschernig case itself, where only one foreign government had objected
to the prevailing practice of American state courts in decedent's estate
cases," but where there was general dissatisfaction with the practice
abroad. 00 On the other hand, the presence of diplomatic protests,
although persuasive on the issue of whether international ill-will is
being engendered by the state practice, would not necessarily indicate
that the state was acting outside its proper constitutional role. In such
a situation, other policies underlying the division of state and federal
power in our system might provide a sound basis for permitting the
state practice even if some international difficulties were created. The
problems created by judicial second-guessing on foreign policy
questions were among the most important factors leading to the
Court's prohibition of judicial determination of international law for
purposes of setting aside the act of state doctrine in the Sabbatino
case. The same reasoning would indicate that a test stressing
exacerbation of foreign relations as a determining factor in defining
proper state-national power relationships requires factual deter-

minations which courts or state legislatures are not able to make with
any precision, consistency or clarity.
The third test, which requires an examination of the purpose of
the questioned state action to determine whether that purpose is one
properly carried out only by the national government, comes closer
than the other two suggested tests to serving as an effective means of
identifying the respective roles of the nation and the state in private
international cases. Nevertheless, it is not completely satisfactory.
Under this "improper purpose" test, if the sole purpose of the state
law is to injure a foreign government by taking action against its own
people in order to encourage that government to alter its policies, that
purpose would render the state law unconstitutional. Where, however,
the state law is designed to accomplish multiple goals, some of which
are legitimately within the state's aegis and some of which are not, the
improper purpose test provides no effective guide that state
legislatures or reviewing courts can use to balance these purposes in
determining the law's constitutionality.
Illustrative of state laws with a single purpose, wholly improper
within the constitutional context, are those requiring reciprocity on
99. See 389 U.S. at 437 n.7.
100. See generally Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 60 COLUM. L.

REv. 257 (1962).
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the part of foreign nations as a prerequisite to the recognition of legal
rights within the state for citizens of those nations. These laws include
not only reciprocal inheritance statutes, but also reciprocity requirements concerning foreign judgments and the enforcement of foreign
revenue laws. A reciprocity requirement amounts to a policy decision
by the state that it will determine rights of parties in cases under its
jurisdiction without regard to individual equities because a foreign
nation has treated American claimants in other cases in a way that the
state disapproves. Such laws have as their raison d'9tre the improper
purpose of influencing the conduct of a foreign nation by encouraging
it to revise its approach toward American citizens in order to secure
better treatment for its own nationals. If such a decision is reached, it
clearly should be made by the national government at whose disposal
are the additional diplomatic tools necessary to aid in bringing about
the desired change in foreign law.' I I Therefore, state laws based on
the single identifiable requirement of reciprocity in connection with
the activities of foreign governments would be unconstitutional,
without investigation into the manner in which they were actuallly
applied.' 02
The improper purpose test does not operate effectively in those

instances where the state law has multiple purposes, some properly
within the ambit of state activity and others clearly within the area of
foreign affairs. In such cases, arriving at an effective determination
101. Chief Justice Fuller correctly labeled the reciprocity rule one of
"retorsion" and suggested that this traditional international means of self-help was
to be invoked only by the executive branch and not by the judiciary. Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
102. An initial reading of the majority's opinion in Zschernig indicates that
the improper purpose test may have been, in fact, the one applied to strike down
the Oregon statute. Although Justice Douglas articulated the majority opinion in
terms of interference with the foreign policy of the national government and
disruption of foreign relations, his emphasis upon prior expressions by state courts
of hostility toward Communist governments, together with his indication that the
reciprocity requirement was designed to procure foreign governmental action,
indicated that he may have been concerned primarily with the likelihood that the
state was attempting to establish its own foreign policy. See Linde, A New
Foreign-Relations Restraint on American States: Zschernig v. Miller, 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 595, 606 (1968). This interpretation appears to be even more reasonable

when it is noted that the United States Government, itself, had indicated that the
Oregon law did not interfere with any policy then being carried out by the
government and that there was no evidence of a general disturbance of foreign

relations brought on by the state's action. 389 U.S. at 432. Nonetheless, the
Court's action in Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398 (1968), indicates that this test will
not be treated as controlling except in situations such as Zschernig where a state
court or legislature has engaged in overt criticism of foreign political institutions.
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involves weighing the undesirability of permitting the state to give
effect to its own conceptions of foreign policy against the desirability
of the state performing its other proper functions as part of the
appropriate division of power between the national and state
governments within the federal system." 03 Without more, the
improper purpose test does not provide an adequate guide to carry out
this weighing process.
Illustrative of such multipurpose state laws are the "benefit and
use" statutes discussed earlier.' 04 The determination by a state that
the proceeds of an estate may not pass to foreign heirs who will not
have the benefit and use of that property can be justified on the
grounds that the state's traditional role is to give effect to the
intention of the decedent.' I If the decedent dies intestate, the state
law on descent and distribution theoretically carries out the decedent's presumed intent by passing property to designated next of
kin, determined by proximity of blood relationship.' 06 If the
decedent dies testate, the state carries out his expressed intent by
giving effect to his will. The benefit and use provisions can be justified
on the theory that the decedent probably would not want his estate to
pass to a foreign government instead of to the individuals named
either in his will or in the distribution statute.' 0 By preventing the
passage of inheritance in those cases in which it is not proven that the
assets would reach the designated heirs, the state carries out its
traditional role. This is accomplished either by passing the estate to
heirs further down the line of descent, by taking the funds in escheat,
or by holding the funds until such time as benefit to and use by the
heirs or devisees becomes possible. Where the state takes the funds in
escheat, it does so on the assumption that if a government is to have
them, the decedent would prefer the government of his domicile state
to that of a foreign country. Thus, on its face, a benefit and use
provision carries out the traditional state function of protecting the
decedent and giving effect to his intent, presumed or actual.
This prima facie purpose of the benefit and use statutes is belied

by a closer examination of their history and actual operation. First,
103. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 117, comment (b) at 370 (1965).
104. Pp. 141-48 supra; see, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. § 2218 (McKinney
1968).
105. F. SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 227 (1869).

106. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 554-55 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
107. See Pilcher v. Dezso, 262 Ala. 249, 78 So. 2d 306 (1955); In re Url's
Estate, 7 N.J. Super. 455, 71 A.2d 665 (Somerset County Ct. 1950); In re Well's
Estate, 204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sur. Ct. 1953).
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statutes of descent and distribution are really administrative devices to
determine the final repose of property owned by a decedent, rather
than devices to give effect to the decedent's intent.' 08 In fact,
evidence in any form other than a valid will that the decedent would
not have desired his property to pass to particular distributees in line
under the statute is not admissible. The benefit and use provisions,
therefore, appear to be designed more to prevent property from
passing to a government which the state considers hostile than to
effectuate the decedent's presumed intent.' 09 Second, the effect of
the benefit and use statutes is to deny the validity of action taken by a
foreign government toward its own residents merely because the
forum state disagrees with the foreign government's economic, social
and political structure. State governments do not withhold passage of
property to heirs living in sister states where, for example, it is
demonstrated that the property passed would be taken by the state of
the heir's domicile to satisfy a judgment or debt owed to the state.
Constitutional arguments aside, providing property with which the
heir may satisfy a legal obligation to a sister state is surely an
appropriate use of the property and a benefit conferred upon the heir.
Where the decedent's domicile state presumes that the decedent would
not want his property to pass to a foreign government in satisfaction
of a legal obligation imposed by that government on its nationals, the
domicile state has, in effect, decided that the use of such property to
meet the foreign legal obligation is not a bona fide use by the heir.
This disapproval of an otherwise valid foreign-created obligation can
be based only upon an evalutation of the government which created it,
together with an implicit finding that it has committed a "wrong" by
creating the obligation within its own borders. Such a state determination directly conflicts with the act of state doctrine.'' 0 The
decedent's domicile state has imposed upon the decedent a political

judgment that will thwart his actual intent when he has left a will and
his presumed intent when he has died intestate. This is true even in
the absence of overt judicial or legislative criticism of the foreign
government or its political structure. Political judgments of this sort
108. See Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490,493 (1850).
109. Most of these statutes were originally designed to prevent passage of
property to heirs living in Nazi Germany, a goal at that time in complete
consonance with United States national policies. See Note, 21 VARD. L. REV.
502, 504-05 (1968).
110. The classic statement of this doctrine appears in Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897): "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory."
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are properly made only by the national government. On the other
hand, the state does have a legitimate interest in determining whether
physical facilities exist to guarantee actual transmission of the
inheritance to the heirs. I ' For example, in situations involving heirs
residing in a country without a reliable banking system, it would
appear to be appropriate for the state to hold the funds until
arrangements for transmission become available. However, the lack of
adequate banking facilities would not justify the state's taking the
property in escheat.
The improper purpose test as articulated in Zschernig does not
indicate in what manner the proper state purposes of protecting the
decedent and of effectively administering estates should be balanced
against the additional political purposes of the statute. Thus, none of
the three tests suggested in the Zschernig opinion is an effective guide
in delineating the functions of state and federal government in private
international matters.
V. THE

RELEVANCE

OF SABBATINO

The raw material from which the Court could have fashioned an
effective method for dealing with problems of federal-state power
relationships in the foreign affairs area was available in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino,l' 2 decided four years before Zschernig. The
Supreme Court in that case dealt with two principal issues. The first
was whether a state or the federal government had the constitutional
power to give content to the act of state doctrine. Once national law
was chosen as the authoritative source for the doctrine, the second

issue was which branch of the national government was to serve as the
law-maker. In deciding the first issue, the Supreme Court went outside
the requirements of the case to rule that the act of state doctrine,
which prevented the examination of foreign governmental acts in
American courts, was national law and controlled state decisions. This
was so because the doctrine arose "out of the basic relationships
between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers."' ' I The Court noted that the doctrine itself represented "a
basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community [which] must be treated
exclusively as an aspect of federal law."'' 14
111. See In re Estate of Kish, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968).
112. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The majority opinion in Zschernig made no
reference to the Sabbatino case.
113. 376 U.S. at 423.
114. 376 U.S. at 425.
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Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, made it clear that no

specific text of the Constitution required the act of state doctrine.
Rather, it was the implications drawn from the structure and special
competences of the branches of the federal government which gave rise
to the doctrine and provided its "constitutional underpinnings."
Consequently, the issue of judicial competence presented a problem
which was "uniquely federal in nature." Justice Harlan concluded that
such a basic decision concerning the competence of a branch of the
government to exercise the kind of authority in question could not be
subject to varying interpretations under the laws of the fifty
states.' I I The doctrine was part of a mechanism for allocating
functions among governmental branches within the framework of the
constitutional structure. Thus, the federal-state controversy in
Sabbatino turned solely on the question, what is the authoritative
body of law-state or federal-which determines the allocation of the
separated powers. The answer to this question was to be found in
federal law, no less than a rule of law based upon a specific text of the
Constitution." 1 6
In the Zschernig case, the question of whether a rule of
preemption existed was clearly a question of federal law. The question
of the scope of such preemption raised different issues and it is on this
question that the Sabbatino Court's treatment of the second principal
issue-who should serve as the law-maker-could have provided insight
into a method of analysis which would have given Zschernig much
greater scope and clarity than it in fact achieved.
The rule promulgated by the lower federal judiciary, which the
Supreme Court reviewed in Sabbatino, was that an act of a foreign

state need not be given effect in domestic courts if that act violated
international law.' 1 7 The second major issue before the Supreme
Court was one of judicial competence to make this determination
under the principles of the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Court ruled that judicial determination of such an issue was
inappropriate. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stressed the nature
of the policy decisions required to apply the rule as set forth by the
lower courts. First, the Court found that to permit the promulgation
of such a rule by the judiciary would interfere with the operation of
national policy by putting the State Department in an embarassing
position if the judicial determination were contrary to the Depart115. 376 U.S. at 424.
116. But see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 811-19 (1964).
117. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), affl'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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ment's stated position in the international negotiation process.
Second, the Court found that the judicial implementation of the
suggested rule might have adverse effects on American foreign political
and economic relations generally, even though no identifiable interference with a specific foreign policy or operation would result. Last,
the purposes underlying the rule-for example, to encourage the
development of an international legal rule against expropriation and to
protect American investors against expropriating foreign sovereignswere best accomplished by political methods and were not suited to
implementation by the judicial branch.1 1 8 The Court, in effect, found
that the judiciary was preempted by the power allocations within the
constitutional framework from deciding the issues implicit in the rule
enunciated in the lower courts. It did so without finding preemption
based either upon an explicitly stated executive policy or upon
positive federal law.
The emphasis in Sabbatino on the necessity for identifying the
appropriate decision-maker among the federal governmental branches,
in terms of the nature of the question to be decided, suggests that
ground had been broken for a definitive statement concerning
state-federal relationships in Zschemig. The fact that the Sabbatino
holding on this issue rested upon an analysis of the appropriate

separation of powers between the judiciary and the federal executive
does not make its method of analysis any less relevant to the
determination of state-federal relationships. While the doctrine of
separation of powers usually is applied to distinguish responsibilities
of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the federal
government, the theory underlying it is equally applicable to the
question of the division of state from federal authority. When
governmental powers in the United States are viewed as a unit, it is
plain that there are four, rather than three, groups of authoritative
law-makers and that the states represent the fourth major group. The
debates at the Constitutional Convention indicate that "checks and
balances" were to operate vertically as well as horizontally and that
the assignment of constitutional law-making power was carried out
with this functional utility in mind. Between the states and the nation,
just as between the three branches of the national government, the
constitutional object was to allocate to different types of decisionmakers the task of establishing authoritatively those policies which
control social relationships. Thus, the functional approach employed
by Justice Harlan to determine that the judiciary should be excluded
from examining foreign acts of state in the light of international law
118. 376 U.S. at 427-37.
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appears to be equally applicable to determine whether the states are
precluded from dealing with problems that the constitutional
structure of the nation suggests are not appropriate for state
determination." 1
The tests used by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino to determine
whether the judiciary should treat itself as being "preempted" were
essentially the same ones which can be derived from the Zschernig
case,' 20 and which were implicit in Clark v. Allen."'2 The difference,
however, lies in the fact that the emphasis on functional analysis
found in Sabbatino is almost wholly absent in Zschernig. The
discussion of both the "vertical" and "horizontal" issues in the
Sabbatino opinion did not represent an attempt to fit the act of state
doctrine within one of a number of available characterizations as a
means of determining the appropriate legal result. Rather, the
emphasis was upon the nature of the decision-making process
protected by the doctrine and upon the necessity of determining
which was the most appropriate governmental division within the
federal structure to make the required decisions. Careful attention to
this kind of analysis in Zschernig would have helped to clarify the
functional interrelationships between the states and the national
government in those private international matters that have implications for the nation's external relations. Only a test which emphasizes
the functional dissimilarities of the states and the nation as law-makers
will serve as an effective demarcation of allocated powers when private
international issues must be decided.

119. Justice Harlan, himself, did not choose to apply this approach to the
solution of the questions in Zschernig. In his concurring opinion, he strongly
criticized the majority for finding a general "interference with foreign relations"
without also finding a specific constitutional or federal law prohibition. He wrote:
"Prior decisions have established that in the absence of a conflicting federal policy
or violation of the express mandates of the Constitution the States may legislate
in areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may have an
incidental effect on foreign relations." 376 U.S. at 458-59.
One case, French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704,
295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968), which appears to recognize this potential relationship
between Sabbatino and Zschernig, cites both cases to support the proposition that
currency regulations of a foreign state are not an appropriate subject for
evaluation by state courts applying local conceptions of public policy. The case
involved a regulation by the Cuban Government which prohibited foreign
investors from receiving currency other than Cuban pesos on Cuban investments.
120. See pp. 139-41 supra.
121. See pp. 137-39 supra.
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VI.

TOWARDS

A FUNCTIONAL

APPROACH

There are at least three reasons for the failure of the courts to
articulate more effectively a guide for identifying the division of state
and federal authority in this area; all of them apply to the Zschernig
decision. The first is based upon a presently outmoded and, perhaps,
initially erroneous concept of the states and the national government
as competing sovereigns, vying for the right to control the national
destiny. Under this view, any "victory" for one of the political
divisions represents a "defeat" for the others. The second reason arises

from the adoption by the courts and by many commentators of a
descriptive rhetoric which is inherently vague and devoid of sufficient
functional inferences to serve as an effective guide to decision. The
third reason lies in a failure both to analyze the situations described
by that rhetoric and to treat the characterizations as functional tools
for describing factual results achieved in particular cases. These three
reasons will be considered in succession.
The concept of the states and the federal government as
competing sovereigns has its roots in the debates of the Constitutional
Convention and in the struggle to ratify the document which the
Convention produced. Several of the plans submitted to the Convention implicitly envisioned such competitive activity by providing
means by which the national government could enforce its will against

the states if any should become obstreperous. These proposed
enforcement measures ranged from a national legislative veto over
state action to provisions that would permit the use of federal military
force when "any state shall oppose or prevent carrying into execution
acts or treaties of the national government."' 22 On the other hand,
the advocates of state sovereignty took as an article of faith the
position that the states were independent sovereigns before the
adoption of the Constitution and that they remained so afterwards.
Proponents of this view argued that the states had the legal rights of
interposition and nullification to prevent "illegal" activities by the
national power.'23 All of these suggested possibilities give emphasis
122. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

967-68 (G. Hunt & J.B. Scott eds. 1920)
(from "The New Jersey Plan," presented to the Convention on June 15, 1787).
123. See G. JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON

FEDERAL-STATE

RELATIONS

IN

AUSTRALIA,

CANADA

AND

THE

UNITED STATES 14-15 (1969). Although it may be difficult today to take such

state action seriously, early illustrations of the activities of the advocates of state
sovereignty are found in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, striking at the
judicial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY chs. 13, 16 (1923).
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to potential divergence of interest between the states and the nation
and each was designed to "settle" a conflict arising from attempts to
assert divergent interests by competing political divisions.' 2 4 This
emphasis is retained in the otherwise useful term, "vertical conflicts of
law," which implicitly describes the process of selection between state
and national authority as one involving a decision between competing
interests. The Supreme Court, in those cases in which it has explicitly
recognized exclusive federal competence in the field of foreign affairs,
has used both a tone and specific phraseology that reflects the
"competitor theory." 1 25 In these cases, the Court has written as if it
were adjudicating between conflicting interests rather than as a
director of coordination, seeking the most appropriate governmental
performance of a necessary duty.
This assumption regarding the existence of a power struggle
between the states and the national government leads to the second
reason for the failure of courts to articulate an effective distinction
between state and federal authority; i.e., the use of a rhetoric which
inaccurately describes the legal relationships between those governmental entities in private international cases and the policies which
those legal relationships reflect. A description of the national

government and the states as political entities operating in different
spheres of interest establishes an implicit dichotomy, described in
these cases by the terms "domestic" and "international." Courts and
commentators ring the changes on these terms: "domestic affairs" and
"foreign affairs;" "private international law" and "public international
law;" "domestic concern" and "foreign relations"--but such rearticulation of the same dichotomy does nothing to clarify the functional
basis of the decisions. As is true of all legal dichotomies, the extreme
and easy cases fall clearly within one characterization or the other.
Most of the cases which reach the appellate courts, however, require

124. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 321 (M. Dunne ed. 1901) (J.
Madison). "The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and
trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for
different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have... viewed
these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as
uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of
each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be
told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in
the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition
or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be
able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other."
125. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920).
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much finer distinctions. In these cases, the rhetoric of dichotomy has
had a limiting rather than a clarifying effect.
The domestic-international dichotomy, in all of its various forms
of statement, describes a legal result, not a set of Platonic norms.
Failure to emphasize this fact leads the courts to examine the two
classifications to determine which one best describes the subjectmatter at hand. In the class of cases involving a general subject-matter

normally controlled by state law, the characterization of the subjectmatter before the court as "domestic" appears foreordained and
automatically leads to the presumption that state law ought to
control. The reasoning involved can be reduced to the following
erroneous syllogism:
States have no power to deal with matters of international concern.
States have dealt with this subject-matter.
Thus, this subject-matter must not be one of international concern.
Despite the rhetorical use of the domestic-international
dichotomy, it is clear to the courts that these labels, in themselves, do
not provide an effective means of evaluating the needs of the nation.
Therefore, although the general subject-matter classification indicates
state law, the courts seek to articulate an "unless" clause which
modifies the results apparently required by the dichotomy. In each
instance, the "unless" clause modifies the dichotomous characterization by reference to a functional element whose presence takes the
situation out of the normal sphere of state power. The actual rule,
then, tends to be stated: in a case containing a foreign element but
otherwise involving traditionally domestic subject-matter, state law
'1 2
will apply unless its operation "interferes with foreign relations;" 6
unless there is an "overriding federal policy;"'1 2 7 or unless there is a
2
need for "national uniformity" in the application of this rule. 1
In order to satisfy any of these "unless" clauses, the court must
find affirmatively in the case before it that the national interest will be
injured by state action or that the legislative jurisdiction of the state
does not extend to the issue raised. This search for interference with a
specific federal interest as a prerequisite to federal preemption leads to
unrealistic descriptions of the legal basis for court decisions. Such
faulty descriptions impede rather than advance the distinction
between federal and state responsibility.
126. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 376 U.S. 429 (1968); In re Estate of
Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968).
127. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
128. See, e.g., Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231
(1969) (Ely, J., dissenting); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'r, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969); Moore, supra note 1, at 263.
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The concept of state-federal conflict and the use of an inaccurate
rhetoric to describe its resolution are interrelated bases for the judicial
failure to articulate an effective approach for separating state from
national authority in private international matters. The compromises
necessary to create an effective federal structure during the Constitutional Convention were brought about, in part, by a recognition that
the federalization of government was a means of attaining both
internal and external security for the constituent states. Hamilton, for
example, answering criticisms of proposals for a federal judiciary
during the struggle to ratify the Convention's product, emphatically
stated:
[The] plain proposition [is] that the peace of the whole ought not to be
left at the disposal of a part. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to
foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for12an9
injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty for preventing it.

This early use of the rhetoric of peace and war to support national
action in areas that previously had been the province of the states has
its vestigial remains in the emphasis on actual state "interference"
with foreign relations as a rationale for prohibiting state action in
some private international cases. But today there is little concern with
a struggle for control between the state and federal governments. The
United States is a de facto, as well as a de jure, nation. Emphasis upon
the coordination of the institutions of government-state and federalshould now replace the emphasis on implicit or potential conflict in
private international matters.
Heretofore, however, the courts and most commentators have
failed to emphasize that, because of the nature of the decision
required, the principal determination on which cases in this area
should turn is whether the matter is best decided by a national rather
than a state decision-maker. This type of functional analysis, without
reliance upon a specific constitutional text, is not new to constitutional interpretation. In Gibbons v. Ogden,"' 0 a landmark decision
under the commerce clause, Chief Justice Marshall made clear that the
overriding consideration in determining state-federal relationships

129. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 111 (M. Dunne ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton).
This emphasis is found throughout these discussions. See, e.g., No. 1, at 12-13 (A.
Hamilton); No. 3, at 20 (J. Jay);No. 4, at 25 (J. Jay); No. 5, at 30 (J. Jay); No.
6, at 35 (A. Hamilton); No. 8, at 49 (A. Hamilton); No. 9, at 56 (A. Hamilton);
No. 11, at 71, 78 (A. Hamilton); No. 23, at 152 (A. Hamilton); No. 41, at 274
(J. Madison).
130. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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should be the identification of the appropriate decision-maker in
terms of broad functional utility. He wrote:
The genious and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to
those internal concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those
which are completely within a particular state, which do not affect other
purpose of
states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere,
1 3 1 for the
executing some of the general powers of government.
In Zschernig, Justice Stewart put the question much more sharply in
his concurring opinion. He sought to identify "the basic allocation of
powers between the states and the nation in matters touching foreign
affairs.",1 32 A clear and effective method of identifying this allocation
is available. It is somewhat surprising that the Supreme Court has not
yet accepted the task of articulating these functional considerations
with more precision.
Given the enormous complexities that surround questions of
foreign affairs, any attempt to articulate a workable general rule to
implement Justice Stewart's suggested approach must be unsatisfactory. If the Court is seeking to identify in each case whether a state
or the national government is the appropriate decision-maker to
control the rights of the parties, its analysis must be a functional one.
Consequently, an identification of the considerations which indicate
functional appropriateness would serve as the most effective guide for
courts and for other law-makers in determining the proper sphere in
which each division of government may operate. In each instance, the

question of allocating constitutional power involves determining
degrees of competence, not identifying absolute competence as the
various dichotomies described earlier would indicate. In other words,
the proper method for dealing with these cases should closely
resemble the governmental interests analysis presently employed in
normal "horizontal" conflict of laws decisions. Whenever the decision
to be made should flow from a governmental unit or branch
structured to represent the entire body politic rather than the
constituency within a particular political subdivision, the state's power
to decide has been constitutionally preempted. This is the thrust of
the existing judicial decisions in which federal rather than state power
has been found to prevail.
131. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. Theodore Roosevelt was characteristically
more direct: "I believe in state's rights wherever state's rights mean the people's
rights. On the other hand, I believe in national rights wherever national rights
mean the people's rights." T. ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM 43
(Prentice Hall ed. 1961).
132. 389 U.S. at 443.
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To determine whether a particular decision is appropriate for the
national and not the state governments, at least three basic interrelated factors should be considered as guides. They are:
(1) whether the limited constituency of the state provides an
appropriate political context in which to make the required
policy judgment;
(2) whether the pertinent information which must be
weighed to determine the wisdom of the policy decision is
available to the state decision-maker; and
(3) whether any potential adverse effects of the decision will
fall upon the entire nation or will be localized within the
particular state.
These three factors, taken together, include, but reorganize and
consolidate, all of the pertinent considerations heretofore alluded to
by the courts to determine the existence of exclusive federal power. If
the weight of any one factor in a given case indicates that the state is
not the appropriate decision-maker, then its power should be deemed
constitutionally preempted by the national government.
The first factor suggested above includes considerations of an
improper purpose underlying the state's action, the need for national
uniformity, and the direct interference by a state with an operating
and identifiable foreign policy of the national government. In each of
these instances, the state's action is not necessarily unconstitutional
because its policy decision is incorrect. Rather, it is unconstitutional
because the limited constituency which provides the political context
in which the policy is formulated is too narrow to be representative of
the nation as a whole. In the case of state legislatures or administrations, the political forces operating upon them are solely those of their
local constituencies. More important, the socio-political context of
which they, in their official capacities, are a product does not bring to
bear that diversity of attitudes present in the national constituency.
This is just as true of the more cosmopolitan states like New York or
California as it is of Mississippi or Montana. Even assuming that state
court judges are not influenced by the potential political consequences
of their decisions, they are representative of the judicial system of a
particular state without that broader charge of national responsibility
which falls on the judges of the federal courts. Thus, whenever the
policy decision required is one which should flow from the national
constituency, not from the limited constituency of a particular state,
state law should be held to be preempted.
Under this reasoning, a state statute or common law rule would be
an improper exercise of power if it required international reciprocity
as a condition precedent to either the enforcement of a foreign
Winter 1971

FEDERAL PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

judgment, the passage of an estate to an alien, or the enforcement of a
foreign revenue law. The decision of the state body politic to establish
such a condition vis-4-vis a foreign nation would be determined only
by the limited foresight available at the state level. There would be
lacking the necessary focus upon both the international consequences
that such action might have for the entire nation and the needs of
other citizens outside the protective aegis of the state's jurisdiction.
The second factor covers those situations in which the state's
action may interfere with a national foreign policy that is not readily
identifiable or that cannot be publicly articulated by the national
government for reasons of international or domestic politics. In
addition, it is designed to include those situations in which the
information concerning potential foreign political, economic or legal
repercussions is not available to the state decision-maker. The
situation in the South African Airways case 1 33 is illustrative. In that

case it seems clear that the airline, as a government-owned entity, was
engaged in implementing the racial policies of the government of
South Africa and, therefore, was in violation of the New York Civil
Rights Act. To permit the state of New York to inquire into this
question and to find a violation by South African Airways, however,
might very well have interfered with a decision by the United States to
ignore the South African Government's racial policies in order to serve
international commercial or political interests related to the desirability of continuing communication between the two countries.
Because of the emotional impact of issues involving race, it would
have been practically impossible for the United Statea to state this
policy publicly without causing disastrous domestic and international
consequences. As was true of the courts compared to the executive in
the Sabbatino case, the information available to the state compared to

that available to the national government in South African Airways
would have been inadequate to permit an effective balancing of the
values to be served by enforcing the public accommodations rule in
the state of New York against the broader international ends to be
secured by withholding such enforcement.
The third factor recognizes the wisdom of Hamilton's axiom:
"Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of
a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall
singly upon one."' ' 4 This factor includes both those situations in
which the action of the state might damage or disrupt the position of
the United States internationally and those instances in which the
133. South African Airways v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 64
Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1970) (discussed pp. 149-50 supra).
134. THF FEDERALIST No. 15, at 102 (M.Dunne ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton).
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action of the state, if taken by the national government, would violate
the principles of customary international law. The dilemma presented
in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'r" is illustrative. The
United States has specifically agreed under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) not to discriminate against goods manufactured in other member nations in favor of domestic products,
except to the extent that tariffs are imposed under the GATT
schedules. The "Buy American" Act of California was designed to
discriminate in precisely this manner. Yet the possible retaliatory
responses by the nations affected by that legislation would fall not
upon the state of California alone, but upon the people of the United
States as a whole. The government of the United States, not that of
the state of California, is required to respond to a GATT investigation
of a violation. To permit a state to take an action of this kind without
the necessity of weighing the benefits to be gained against possible
direct adverse consequences places the state in a position which
encourages irresponsibility.
A1 more pointed illustration is found in Tupman Thurlow Co. v.
Moss.

37

A Tennessee law required the labeling of foreign meat

products as such and imposed a license fee upon persons who handled
them. 1 38 No similar provisions applied to domestic products. The
United States argued as amicus curiae that the Tennessee law was
unconstitutional because it interfered with United States foreign trade
policy as set forth ,n the Trade Expansion Act of 196213 and various
bilateral and muitilateral treaties. The government referred to an
affidavit filed by William M. Roth, Acting Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations in the Kennedy Round of tariff talks, which
noted:
[T] he Tennessee and similar state legislation is totally inconsistent with and is

endangering the United States' policy of expanding trade among the countries
of the free world.... Our bargaining position and the credibility of our offers
of tariff concessions are being adversely affected by the Tennessee legislation.
A number of the countries participating in the negotiations have protested

to the United States about this and similar state statutes, and it is feared
that offers of tariff concessions which
otherwise would be made will be
40
withheld because of this legislation.'
135. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969) (discussed pp. 148-49
supra).

136. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3
(1948), T.I.A.S. 1700.
137. 252 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
138. Chs. 34, 367, [1965] Public Acts Tennessee 67, 1093.
139. 76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (1962).
140. 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 483, 484 (1966) (excerpts from the

Memorandum of the United States as amicus curiae).
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The three-judge panel did not reach this question because it found the
Tennessee law unconstitutional as an interference with foreign
commerce. The amicus brief, however, effectively sets forth the
reasons for finding federal preemption even if no commerce clause
violation had been found. "'1 The functional test urged by the United
States in the Tupman Thurlow case would cover all situations in which
state activity could be found to operate in an area where repercussions
from such actions would fall, not upon the state itself, but upon the
United States in its position as the international representative of its
people.
This same test would deny final state authority in situations where
private rights of foreign nationals turn on the content of customary
international legal rules. For example, questions concerning
diplomatic immunity which are not otherwise decided according to
positive federal law, either in the form of a consular convention or
under federal statutes,' 42 appear to be governed by state interpretation of customary international legal principles. The extent to which
an erroneous application of these principles contravenes federal law
appears still to be unresolved.
Illustrative are situations involving diplomats not accredited to the
United States who are in transit through the country, or concerning
claims of immunity of servants and other non-diplomatic employees
of embassies, consolates or missions. 4 In Bergman v. De Sieyes,'"4
the defendant, a representative of France on his way to Bolivia where
he was accredited, was served with process in an action for deceit as he
passed through New York City. In the diversity action, Judge Learned
Hand ruled that the law of New York applied to determine the
question of immunity. He wrote:
[S] ince the defendant was served while the cause was in the state court, the
law of New York determines its validity, and, although the courts of that
state look to international law as a source of New York law, their
interpretation of international law is controlling upon us, and we are to
follow them so far as they have declared themselves. Whether an avowed
refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain
misapprehension of it, would present
a federal question we need not
4
consider, for neither is present here. s
141. In those instances in which a specific conflict with a bilateral treaty was
present, the supremacy clause would, of course, control.
142. See, e.g., Foreign Relations and Intercourse Act, 22 U.S.C. § 252
(1964).
143. People v. Roy, 21 Misc. 2d 303, 200 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
1959) (prosecution of Canadian Ambassador's chauffer for speeding).
144. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
145. 170 F.2d at 361.
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This kind of unfortunate application of the doctrine of Erie v.
Tompkins' 4 6 was predicted and correctly criticized by Professor
Philip Jessup shortly after the Erie case was decided.
[A] ny attempt to extend the doctrine of the Tompkins case to international
law should be repudiated by the Supreme Court.... Any question of applying
international law in our courts involves the foreign relations of the United
States and can thus be brought within a federal power.... The duty to apply it
is one imposed upon the United States as an international person. The several
states of the Union are entities unknown to international law. It would be as
our ultimate authority
unsound as it would be unwise to make our state1courts
47
for pronouncing the rules of international law.
Professor Jessup's forceful statement is equally applicable to
potential conflicts between the asserted police power of the state and
international legal principles. In People v. Roy, 148 a New York state
court considered the power of the federal government to be
preempted by the state police power where traffic violations by
diplomats were concerned. In that case, which involved a traffic ticket
issued to the chauffeur of the Indonesian Ambassador to Canada while
driving his employer through New York State from United Nations
Headquarters, the court said, in dicta, "Safety on the public highway,

particularly a high-speed super-highway of the Thruway type, is of
paramount importance to the People of the State of New York. It is
impossible for any government to grant any kind of immunity from
property damage, injury, or death to any person using our
highways."' 4 9 As late as 1966, the New York Assembly apparently
assumed that it had authority to deal with traffic violations by
diplomats when it passed a bill to permit revocation of diplomatic
license plates of those who commit three parking violations within one
year.' 50
The third suggested functional guide would make it clear that the
question of whether diplomatic immunity existed under principles of
customary international law in instances of this type would be
determined by federal law. This is not to suggest that state courts
would be prohibited from applying principles of customary international law in cases in which those rules were pertinent; it indicates
merely that their determinations would become reviewable under
146. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
147. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939).
148. 21 Misc. 2d 303, 200 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1959).
149. 21 Misc. 2d at 305, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 614 (emphasis added).
150. See Garretson, The Immunities of Representatives of Foreign States, 41

N.Y.U.L. REV. 67, 74 & n.30 (1966).
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federal common law and that a federal determination of the content
of customary international law would be authoritative in both state
and federal courts.
The identification of the three factors outlined above as guides to
determining the constitutionality of state actions should not be
expected to serve as a panacea for difficult constitutional questions.
Each of these factors must be weighed against other values of our
federal system, including the principle that most private law matters
ought to be decided at the lowest possible governmental level where
the influence of the people can be most directly felt. Such a
functional approach would, however, focus the attention of the
courts, both state and federal, as well as other organs of government,
upon the true nature of the questions presented in cases of this kind.
In addition, it would provide the Supreme Court with a useful
analytical tool with which to mould the high policy determinations
which face it when constitutional issues of state versus national power
in this area are raised. The national government is charged with the
duty of adjusting the relationships of this nation with other nations
having widely diverse interests and philosophies in an economically
and politically divided world. It should not be hindered in achieving a
wise adjustment by occasional pin-pricks from state actions ostensibly
justified by a mechanical characterization of a subject matter as
"domestic" or "local." Just as important, application of a careful
functional analysis would not deprive the states of authority in the
vast majority of situations containing international elements where
primarily state interests are concerned and where the authority of
state decision-makers is appropriately exercised.

Vol. 5-No. 1

